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Abstract 
A chronological survey demonstrating the cryptanalysis of RC4 stream cipher is presented in this paper. We have summarized 
the various weaknesses of RC4 algorithm followed by the recently proposed enhancements available in the literature. It is 
established that innovative research efforts are required to develop secure RC4 algorithm, which can remove the weaknesses of 
RC4, such as biased bytes, key collisions, and key recovery attacks on WPA. These flaws in RC4 are still offering an open 
challenge for developers. Hence our chronological survey corroborates the fact that even though researchers are working on RC4 
stream cipher since last two decades, it still offers a plethora of research issues. The attraction of community towards RC4 is still 
alive. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of security is generally interpreted as the idea of confidentiality of data being transmitted, 
particularly the digital information transmitted over the wireless network. However the need of confidentiality of 
information is indeed a social paradigm. Security is provided using cryptographic primitives. As shown in Fig. 1, the 
cryptographic primitives are classified into three main categories; not using key, symmetric key and asymmetric 
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key1. Although Fig. 1 is not presenting an exhaustive list of these primitives but is highlighting the important and 
relevant areas.  
 
In this paper, we have focused on symmetric key ciphers which are also known as secret key or single key 
ciphers. Secret key ciphers are further classified as stream ciphers and block ciphers. In stream ciphers, one bit or a 
byte is processed/encrypted at a time, a key stream is produced which is a pseudorandom sequence of bits.  A 
plaintext (a sequence of bits/bytes) is converted into ciphertext (again a sequence of bits/bytes of same length as that 
of plaintext) by hiding the plaintext with a keystream, using a simple XOR operation. Whereas in block ciphers, a 
block of bits/bytes/words is processed at a time. We have worked on stream ciphers which are further classified as 
synchronous and self-synchronous stream ciphers. Synchronous stream ciphers (SSC) are prominently discussed in 
literature. However, generally due to the design problems, self-synchronizing stream cipher (SSSC) are not much 
explored in literature and are less used in practice2. Different synchronous stream ciphers available in the literature 
are RC4, E0 (a stream cipher used in Bluetooth), A5/1 and A5/2 (stream ciphers used in GSM), SNOW 3G, ZUC 
(4G stream ciphers), Rabbit, FISH, and HC-256 etc.3-6.  
 
The strength of stream ciphers is the random keystream which ensures the computational security of the cipher. 
In cryptographic primitives non-random events which can be computationally recognized either in the internal states 
and in the output keystream are generally not desirable. Thus the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers is imperatively 
focused on the identification of non-random events and hence extensive analysis of stream ciphers is done till date to 
identify the occurrence of non-random events. Table 1 and Figs. (2, 3) demonstrates the overview of various 
cryptanalytic attack models, modes of attacks and goals of intruder in stream ciphers respectively. The general 
classification of the cryptanalytic attacks on stream ciphers with the assumption that what is known to the intruder is 
shown in Table. 1. These cryptanalytic attacks are also known as attack models. Further on the basis of these attack 
models and the knowledge of intruder (what is known to intruder), Fig. 2 presents the different modes in which the 
intruder can attack the cipher. Intruder mount these models and modes of attack on stream ciphers with the goals as 
shown in Fig. 3. In this paper we have presented the chronological comprehensive survey of the most prevalent and 
commercially used RC4 stream cipher. We have focused on RC4 because it outperforms amongst all the modern 
stream ciphers. Though the algorithm is publicly revealed in 1994 through internet but due to its simplicity everyone 
gets attracted towards it and has been adopted worldwide. The cipher has gained immense popularity due to its 
design simplicity and has been widely adopted in various software and web applications. It is used in various 
network protocols such as WEP (Wireless equivalent privacy), WPA (Wi-Fi protected access), and SSL (Secure 
socket layer). Also it is extensively used in Microsoft windows, Apple OCE (Apple Open Collaboration 
Environment), secure SQL (a server for database management and data warehousing solution) etc. It is found that 
regardless of many efforts made by researchers in improving the flaws of RC4 cipher, still there are number of 
biases exist in the keystream, key recovery can be made from state and certain sets of keys do exist that can generate 
similar states. It corroborate the fact that even after the decades of research, the RC4 stream cipher continues to oơer 
research problems ofinterest to the researchers. 
 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is presented in section 2. Section 3 describes the various 
weaknesses observed in RC4 stream cipher. Existing proposals for the enhancement of the cipher are given in 

























Fig. 1. Cryptographic primitives 
 
Table 1. Broad Classification of the Cryptanalytic attacks on Stream ciphers (RC4) 
 
Type of Cryptanalytic Attacks Information known to cryptanalytic 
Ciphertext only Intruder has partial knowledge of some ciphertext (CT) messages but does not   know 
anything about plaintext message (PT) 
Known plaintext Intruder has some knowledge of the PT-CT pairs 
Chosen plaintext Intruder knows the encryption algorithm that produces CT for the PT messages chosen by 
intruder using a secret key 
Known initialization vector (IV) Intruder either has some knowledge of IV or choose some IV and obtains the corresponding 
output keystream with the secret key. This is also known as re-synchronization attack and 
follows known plaintext attack for obtaining keystream and CT. 
Chosen ciphertext Intruder knows the encryption algorithm that produces PT for the CT messages chosen by 






Fig. 2 Modes of attack in stream ciphers 
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a) RC4 Key scheduling algorithm   b) RC4 Pseudo random generation algorithm  
 
                                                     Fig. 4 RC4 encryption 
2. Related Work 
RC4 is known to be one of the simplest and widely adopted cipher. However, the simplicity of RC4 makes it 
vulnerable to different security attacks. The cipher was designed in 1984 and was anonymously released on mails 
and news groups in 1994. Since then many cryptanalysts have worked on the weaknesses of the cipher. The basic 
functioning of RC4 is shown in Fig. 4 and shows that RC4 has two basic constituents; Key scheduling algorithm 
(KSA), Pseudo random number generator (PRGA). It is observed that PRGA generates a pseudorandom output 
sequence (bytes) from the permuted internal state which itself is a random sequence. The cryptanalyst is always in 
search of the statistical weaknesses of the output sequence. Statistical weaknesses are the biases in the random 
keystream that can be exploited with a very high probability of success, to differentiate the generated RC4 
keystream from a truly random sequence of bytes. 
     Hence the main goal of an intruder while attacking RC4 is to investigate the non-random behavior either in the 
internal state or in the output keystream. The brief summary of security attacks on RC4 since its first public 
appearance to date is shown in Table 2. We have elaborated our discussion with the main focus on the security 
weaknesses of RC4 in WLAN protocols. For security provisioning RC4 is extensively used in WLAN security 
protocols. WEP (Wired equivalent privacy) was the first security protocol used for Wi-Fi security in IEEE 802.11 
LANs and is based on RC4 encryption algorithm. Due to the number of attacks on WEP such as; related key 
attacks7, Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack (FMS)8, Korek practical attacks9, Mantin attack on RC4 10 and WEP, 
Initialization: 
forifrom 0 to 255 
    S[i] := i 
End for 
j := 0 
   
Key scheduling algorithm: 
forifrom 0 to 255 
j := (j + S[i] + 
key[imodkeylen]) mod 256 





S Pseudo random generation 
algorithm: 
i := 0 
j := 0 
while Generating Output: 
i := (i + 1) mod 256 
j := (j + S[i]) mod 256 
swap values ofS[i] and S[j] 






Goal of Intruder 
Key Recovery 
State Recovery Distinguish attack 
Key Correlation 
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Klien attack11, Tews, Weinmann and Pyshkin (TWP) attack12, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux (VV) attacks13, Tews and 
Beck (TB) attack14, Shepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux (SVV) attack15-17, and Shepehrdad, Susil, Vaudenay and 
Vuagnoux (SSVV) attack18, WEP was declared as an insecure protocol. Later it is replaced by WPA (Wi-Fi 
protected access) which also make use of RC4 as its core element. WPA defended against many attacks in WEP. 
WPA has again proved to be a weak protocol due to TB data injection attacks14, and SVV attacks17. Further a new 
protocol WPA2 was proposed by the Wi-Fi alliance which uses AES block cipher as an encryption algorithm 
instead of RC4. Though WPA2 is a secure protocol, removing many weaknesses of WEP and WPA but its hardware 
based applications are not cost effective as compare to WEP and WPA where RC4 was used as a basic module. 
Inspite of so many attacks and weaknesses in WEP, it is enormously opted in large number of applications due to its 
simplicity over WPA and WPA2.  RC4 is also broadly accepted in web security. It is used in TLS (Transport layer 
security) /SSL to offer security over the internet. The RC4 is known to the best choice for TLS/SSL as it can 
mitigate many attacks on the protocol. However recently in 2013 and 2014, a new security attack19-22 on RC4 of 
TLS and WPA protocol has been proposed, but still RC4 is considered to be the most popular algorithm for 
protocol. Although there had been many successful security breaches in the protocols using RC4, but the striking 
combination of robustness and design elegance of RC4 has made it most preferred protocol for last two decades. 
Different researchers have proposed variety of its implementations to make the cipher more secure, but the available 
literature demonstrate the insecurity of RC4 till date. The most recent literature19-22 on RC4 and its applications in 
WEP, WPA and TLS reveals the fact that the RC4 is still an attraction for community and also offer many research 
issues. It is the simplest protocol to date and offering variety of research issues even after years of analysis. 
3. Weaknesses of RC4 
KSA and PRGA are the two major constituents of RC4. A simple scrambling of input keystream and the initial 
state is performed in KSA and results in a new state, which is nothing more than an initial state permutation. A 
pseudorandom output byte sequence is generated from internal permutation after PRGA. Intruder attack the cipher 
with the intention, either to recover the original key or the internal state or the output keystream to have an access on 
the input message and the future messages.  From the available literature, based on these two components of RC4 
we have briefly summarized some of the weaknesses of RC4 as below: 
 
x Weak keys in RC4:Weak keys are the small set of keys in RC4 which leaves some traces in the keystream 
generated after KSA or in the output bytes after PRGA. If such traces are followed by the intruder he/she 
can easily recover the key from the internal state or the output stream. 
x Biased bytes: In stream ciphers the event or bytes are said to be biased if an event occurs with different 
probability as that from the uniformly random sequence of bits/bytes. To study the non-random behaviour 
of bytes is the goal of attacker. Several biases or correlation related to secret key, state variables, and short 
term and long term biases related to keystream bytes are there in RC4 KSA and PRGA.  
x Distinguishers: if the events in RC4 are biased and are solely based on keystream bytes then such biased 
events are referred to as distinguishers.  
x Key collisions: In RC4 KSA, it may be possible to generate a similar state even if two different keys are 
used and a similar output keystream will be produced. Such a scenario is known as key collision or related 
key pairs. Construction of such key pairs is the goal of attacker. 
x Key recovery from state: RC4 PRGA is reversible in nature. From any given state of PRGA it is easy to 
reach the internal state and it is quite easy to recover the secret key from the internal state. 
x Key recovery from keystream: Key can be easily recovered from output keystream and this weakness of 
RC4 was exploited in WEP and WPA. 
x State recovery: the state-space size in RC4 is N! × N2, where N! is the space of N bytes in the internal state 
S and N2 comes from the all possible combinations of indices i andj. Hence in RC4, for N=256 the total 
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state-space available is, 256! × 2652 ≈ 21700. Inspite of such a big state-space, the state recovery is possible 
in the cipher.   
Table 2. Cryptanalysis on RC4 stream cipher 
 
Year Weak keys* and key 
recovery from state 
Key recovery from key 
stream 
State recovery attack Biases and distinguishers 
1995 -Roos 23 
-Wagner weak keys24 
- - -Roos biases23 
1996 - - - -Glimpse bias20 
1997 - - - -Golic long term bias29 
1998 - - - KMP branch and bound 
approach 31 
 
2000 -Related key-pairs25 - -Iterative probabilistic 
cryptanalysis32 
-Digraph biases 30 
2001 - FMS WEP attack8 - Broadcast attack31 
2002 - - - - 
2003 - - State part known attack32  
2004 - Korek WEP attack9 -  
2005 - Mantin WEP attack10 -  
2006 - Klein WEP attack11 - - 
2007 - short related keys attack -TWP WEP attack12 
-VV WEP attack13 
Hill climb search attack33  
2008 -Difference equations 
-key byte  
-bit by bit approach attack 
- -generative pattern34 
-iterative probabilistic attack35 
Maitra and Paul conditional 
Bias37 
2009 -key collision attacks 
-bidirectional search attacks 
-TB WEP and WPA attacks14 - - 
2010  SVV WEP attack15 - SVV biases in key and state 
variables17 
2011 -New key collisions SVV WEP and WPA attack16 - -keylength biases37 
2012 - SVV WEP and WPA attack17 -  
2013 -Near colliding keys SSVV passive attack on WEP18 - -TLS and WPA attack38 
2014 - - - -biased bytes 22 
4. Enhancements in RC4 stream cipher 
Due to the cryptanalytic attempts, many variants of RC4 have been proposed by researchers. We have reported 
some recent papers on the enhancements of RC4 algorithm. In39 authors have studied theoretically the RC4 KSA. It 
is found that the expected number of times each value of the state permutation is moved by the indices i, j is not 
uniform. A modified RC4 with three layer scrambling is proposed. Analysis of RC4+ illustrates that the modified 
algorithm avoids some of the existing weaknesses of RC4. To increase the security of RC4, a new PRGA, based on 
conventional RC4 is proposed in40-41. It is revealed that the proposed RC4 has two internal states and has removed 
the foundation of many security attacks on RC4 and is also faster than the existing conventional RC4. In42 authors 
have proposed a new variant of RC4 called Quad-RC4 without changing the basic structure of conventional RC4. 
The proposed RC4 structure promises the reasonable security and a high throughput. In term of speed the proposed 
cipher performs much better in comparison with HC-128, the fastest software stream cipher amongst the e-
STREAM finalists.A new variant of RC4 known as FJ-RC4 is proposed by authors43. In FJ-RC4 is designed in a 
manner such that in KSA input key is divided into three parts and the structure of PRGA is same as with 
conventional RC4. A new keystream after KSA is generated in three rounds whereas PRGA performs only single 
round.Another variant of RC4 known as effective RC4 cipher is proposed44 where the security analysis is performed 
by using Shannon’s Secrecy theory and numerical values are obtained to analyse the secrecy. It is proposed that the 
improved RC4 cipher can be used in software applications where there is requirement of both the throughput and 
secrecy. Further a new PRGA RC4B is proposed in45, which provides better immunity against the known attacks. 
The new variant of RC4 is proposed in46 which provides high security along with long period of KSA keystream, 
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large complexity and having good statistical properties. In47 authors have proposed a modified RC4 (MRC4) by 
modifying both KSA and PRGA. From the available literature it is found that many recent RC4 variants have been 
proposed by researchers. Some are targeted towards achieving better security by removing the non-uniformity of 
bytes or by removing the correlation between key and the state bytes and some towards better performance in terms 
of time or throughput. Some of the proposals have entirely changed the basic structure of RC4 which is generally 
not desirable because the robust design of RC4 is the basic strength of the cipher. However, inspite of so many 
proposals on RC4, many open issues related to the searches of more biases, key collisions in keystream, and key 
recovery attack on WPA exists on RC4 till date. Therefore there is a strong need of the modifications of RC4 
without changing the basic structure of RC4. It is recommended that while considering these existing weaknesses of 
RC4 one can design a new enhanced RC4 stream cipher exhibiting a sufficient resistance against the existing 
weaknesses of the cipher. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented the chronological survey of the cryptanalysis on the RC4 since its first public 
appearance to date. It is found that the simple and robust structure of RC4 is still attracting the community. It is 
extensively deployed in wireless network and internet protocols. We have presented a broad classification of the 
existing weaknesses in RC4 followed by the measure taken by various researchers to improve the security of the 
cipher by removing the existing weaknesses. Although many improved variants of RC4 which removes the existing 
weaknesses and enhance the security of the cipher may be found in the literature, but the question about which is the 
best solution still remain unanswered, since each of them focus on specific attack or weakness. Further inspite of all 
the developments reported in the literature, there are still many open research challenges and issues related to 
searches of more biases, key collisions in keystream, and key recovery attack on WPA. Therefore it is concluded 
that there is ample scope to further investigate the issues in RC4 particularly the non-random behavior of bytes in 
the state permutation, and to develop a new, more efficient and effective RC4 encryption algorithm.  
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